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In recent years, it has come to attention that governments have been doing mass surveillance of personal com-
munications without the consent of the citizens. As a consequence of these revelations, developers have begun
releasing new protocols for end-to-end encrypted conversations, extending and making popular the old Off-
the-Record protocol. Several new implementations of such end-to-end encrypted messaging protocols have
appeared, and commonly used chat applications have been updated with these implementations as well. In this
survey, we compare the existing implementations, where most of them implement one of the recent and popular
protocols called Signal. We conduct a series of experiments on these implementations to identify which types
of security and usability properties each application provides. The results of the experiments demonstrate that
the applications have variations of usability and security properties, and none of them are infallible. Finally, the
paper gives proposals for improving each application w.r.t. security, privacy, and usability.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the trend to use mobile applications for communication has grown and become a standard method
of communication between people. New messaging applications started to emerge and try to replace traditional
SMS, but building them with security and privacy in mind was not important for the developers in the beginning.
The popular messaging tools used in recent years did not support end-to-end encryption, only standard client to
server encryption, which gives the service providers access to more private information than necessary. When
Edward Snowden published the secret papers about NSA,1 people finally understood that mass surveillance was an
issue, and secure mobile messengers became more critical and popular.
People are more prone to understand the privacy implications of mass surveillance [41]. Edward Snowden
has sparked a heated debate throughout the world about individual privacy which is undermined by the mass
surveillance that multiple countries have been doing for decades.2 No need to look further than the first quarter of
2017, when WikiLeaks3 leaked documents from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The leak, codenamed
“Vault 7” by WikiLeaks is the largest ever publication of confidential documents from the agency.4 The documents
that leaked have information on how to get access to mobile phones or personal computers without the user’s
knowledge, and how the CIA did mass surveillance.
0Disclaimer: All the tests reported here were performed in the summer of 2017, and since applications in this area are very dynamic,
some of the specific implementation recommendations and observations that we make may have already been treated by the developers.
However, this work still should provide guidance for a new user on how to check which desired features are implemented by a specific
application; even more so if the application is among the six surveyed here. More details for this paper can be found in our technical reports
[27, 39].
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden#Global_surveillance_disclosures
Two feature films on this topic are: Oliver Stone’s https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snowden_(film) and Laura Poitras’ https:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizenfour
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_government_mass_surveillance_projects
3https://wikileaks.org/
4 “Wikileaks Unveils ’Vault 7’: The Largest Ever Publication Of Confidential CIA Documents; Another Snowden Emerges”,
authored by Tyler Durden in the Zerohedge, March 2017. Available at http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-03-07/
wikileaks-hold-press-conference-vault-7-release-8am-eastern
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Several companies started implementing secure messaging protocols and applications to counter the mass
surveillance and offer an end-to-end encrypted messaging system which does not leak any information about the
user’s message content. However, the problem with new and bleeding-edge applications is their adoption. After
a while, companies such as Google, Facebook, and Open Whisper Systems joined forces to implement protocols
into already widely adopted applications such as WhatsApp, which has over one billion monthly active users.5
Instant Messaging clients that did not provide asynchronous communication became uninteresting because of
the rise of smart-phones and applications that were not always online. The most mature secure messaging protocol,
Off-the-Record, did not support asynchronous messaging, which motivated the development of new protocols with
asynchronous communication built-in. The most notable is the Signal application with their protocol also called
Signal. After a while, the new protocol became quite popular among developers and researchers [45, 18, 10, 28, 43].
Subsequently, the Signal protocol started to be implemented in other applications, which were supporting only
client-to-server encryption until then.
Quite a number of new secure messaging applications exist (in 2017 we counted six, which we survey in
this work) that offer end-to-end encrypted message conversations over mobile phones and computers, but these
often sacrifice usability aspects for security. In the light of the above motivations one would probably prioritise
privacy and security, but in order to attract most normal users it should be possible to have the best of both worlds.
Applications should give enough information for the users to know when or if a conversation is not secure anymore
and the options to secure it once again. Moreover, the security controls should be intuitive and usable enough to be
handled by a majority of people, not only for the technology inclined ones.
The goals of this study
The area of end-to-end encryption in instant messaging applications has become rather broad recently. It is difficult
for a user to find digestible information sources, and even less when it comes to comparative integrated studies.
Therefore, our first goal is:
G1: Provide comprehensible and comparative study of relevant approaches to end-to-end encrypted messaging
applications.
A detailed analysis of the security and privacy properties provided by secure messaging protocols is not easy
and there are very few such studies (which we build upon). End-to-end encrypted messaging technologies should
be both usable so to allow a wide adoption, but also have rather strong security requirements. These two, i.e.,
usability and security, are usually conflicting, and a good balance is difficult to find. This leads to our second goal:
G2: Overview the security and privacy properties provided by current end-to-end messaging technologies, and to
what extent existing applications achieve these properties.
The Signal application (and protocol) is one of the most used end-to-end messaging technologies currently
available for smart phones and desktop PCs. Moreover, the Signal protocol is employing state of the art encryption
and key establishment techniques.
G3: Describe for non-experts the security mechanisms behind the Signal protocol.
There is little research in the area of usability vs. security in secure messaging applications. In the last couple
of years, it has become increasingly important for researchers to look at the usability and not purely to the technical
issues surrounding secure messengers. Schroder et al. [42] were the first to look at the usability issues for end-
to-end encrypted messengers, doing a comprehensive user study of the usability of Signal’s security features and
proposing fixed to the issues they found with users failing to detect and deter man-in-the-middle attacks. In this
5The Statistics Portal: “Number of monthly active Whatsapp users worldwide from April 2013 to December 2017 (in millions)” https:
//www.statista.com/statistics/260819/number-of-monthly-active-whatsapp-users/
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paper we look at the same types of potential attack spots as [42] did, looking also at the application interface, and
extending to five more applications than Signal.
Unger et al. [45] did a comprehensive study of secure messaging protocols, looking at the security properties
around trust establishment, conversation security, and transport privacy. Their survey shows that protocols that
specialise in encryption do not achieve every important security and privacy property. In this paper, our properties
of interest are based on those from [45], focusing on the conversation security for the three major end-to-end
encrypted messaging protocols that we found.
Main Contributions
• We make a comprehensive analysis of applications that implement secure messaging, by performing five
testing scenarios to study their essential security and usability properties. We also provide suggestions for
improvements.
• We provide an (updated) overview of conversation security in secure messaging protocols, following [45].
Subsequently, we describe the inner security workings of the latest versions of two major protocols (OTR
and Signal), striving to make these understandable for a general audience.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a systematisation of knowledge about three
secure end-to-end encrypted messaging protocols, with a discussion of their security properties. Section 3 presents
the study testing six mobile phone applications that support either the secure messaging protocols presented before
or their own variants which are not open source applications. Section 4 summarises the results from the test
scenarios in a unified and comparative manner. Section 5 discusses the applications as a whole also providing
recommendations for improvements. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Background on Secure Messaging Protocols
This section provides background on secure messaging protocols that are implemented by the applications analysed
in this paper. First we present the attacker models that we consider and assumptions that we make about the user
applications, then we review basic properties relevant for end-to-end encrypted messaging. Section 2.4 surveys
Off-the-Record (OTR), which is the baseline for the two other protocols, Signal (surveyed in Section 2.5) and
Matrix, which are new protocols that are actually implemented (or copied) by the current popular secure messaging
applications.
This section builds on the comprehensive survey [45], as well as on various other resources regarding these
protocols. Most of the resources for the two new protocols Signal and Matrix are online, since these protocols have
not come out of academia. However, both are built on the good foundation laid by the OTR protocol, which has
been well studied in academia [8, 44, 12, 1, 5, 30, 22], and also complemented by significant online resources.
2.1 Relevant Threat Models
We assume the following adversaries:
• Active adversaries: Man-in-The-Middle attacks are possible on both local and global networks by adding
a proxy between the applications and servers handling the messages. These are under the usual assumptions
of a Dolev-Yao model [15].
• Passive adversaries: These adversaries log everything that is sent to and from a user and could potentially
use that information to keep track of who users talk to and when. Passive adversaries could also log infor-
mation such as messages and keys, even though the contents of the messages are encrypted.
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• Service providers: The messaging systems that require centralized infrastructure (such as Signal and Matrix)
need to keep the information about users secure. The service operators could at any time become a potential
adversary.
We assume the endpoints of the messaging applications, e.g., an app on a smartphone, are secure and that the
devices do not have malware that could exploit the messaging application.
2.2 Security principles relevant for end-to-end encrypted messaging
Different secure messaging protocols capture different security principles in various degrees, and are important
when comparing specifications of applications implementing them. Most security and privacy features that we
review here are also being found in [45].
End-to-End Encryption: Communication encryption protocols like Transport Layer Security (TLS) [13] are de-
signed to secure communications between a client and server. Messaging applications that allow two parties
to communicate to each other through a server, can use TLS to secure their communication against network
attackers. Messages sent to the server are decrypted by the server, which means that it can read, store or edit
the message before encrypting again and sending it to the other user. Often servers cannot be trusted, as they
can be hacked by an adversary, or may be contacted by law enforcement to give information sent by clients
through the server [17]. End-to-end encryption ensures that the endpoints do the encryption while the servers
only transmit the messages without network attackers nor a corrupted server being able to see the content.
Confidentiality: Confidentiality ensures that the necessary level of secrecy is enforced at each junction of data
processing, preventing unauthorized disclosure [24]. Confidentiality can be provided by encrypting data
while it is stored and transmitted. In cryptographic protocols confidentiality is essential to ensure that keys
and other data are available only as intended [9]. Attackers try to break confidentiality by stealing password
files, breaking encryption schemes, etc. Users, on the other hand, can intentionally or accidentally disclose
sensitive information by not encrypting it before sending it to another person, or by falling prey to a social
engineering attack [24].
Integrity: Integrity ensures that no one throughout the transmission modifies the messages. Hardware, software,
and communication mechanisms must work in concert to maintain, process, and move data to intended
destinations, without unexpected alterations. Systems that enforce and provide this security property ensure
that attackers, or mistakes by users, do not compromise the integrity of systems or data [24]. This can
be achieved through the use of hash functions in combination with encryption, or by use of a message
authentication code (MAC) to create a separate check field. Data integrity is a form of integrity that is
essential for most cryptographic protocols to protect elements such as identity fields or nonces [9].
Authentication: Authentication is meant to identify the parties in a conversation. Message authentication is also
called data-origin authentication, and protects the integrity of the sender of the message [6, 7]. Message
authentication codes can provide assurance about the source and integrity of a message. A message au-
thentication code is computed by using the message and a shared secret between the two parties [23]. If
an adversary changes the message, then the computed MAC would be different as well, and moreover, an
adversary cannot produce a valid MAC because only the sender and receiver have the shared secret.
Perfect Forward Secrecy: A key establishment protocol provides forward secrecy if a compromise of long-term
keys of a set of principals does not compromise the session keys established in previous protocol runs in-
volving those principals. Typical examples of protocols which provide forward secrecy are key agreement
protocols where the long-term key is only used to authenticate the exchange. Key transport protocols in
which the long-term key is used to encrypt the session key cannot provide forward secrecy [9].
Future Secrecy: Future secrecy, as it is called by Open Whisper Systems [32], (sometimes also called back-
ward secrecy) is the guarantee that the compromise of long-term keys does not allow subsequent ciphertexts
6The Snowden Phone: A Comparative Survey of Secure Instant Messaging Mobile Applications(authors’ version)
to be decrypted by passive adversaries [45]. A protocol supports future secrecy when it can provide the
“self-healing” aspect of the Diffie-Hellman ratchet, which will be described in section 2.4, because if any
ephemeral key is compromised or found to be weak at any time, the ratchet will heal itself and compute new
ephemeral keys for the future messages sent during the conversation [32].
Deniability: Deniability is a property common to new secure messaging protocols, where it is not possible for
others to prove that the data was sent by some particular conversation party. If Bob receives a message from
Alice, he can be sure it was Alice that sent it, but cannot prove to anyone else that. To provide deniability,
usually secure messaging protocols have a mechanism to allow anyone to forge messages, after a conversa-
tion, to make them look like coming from someone in the conversation. Deniability also includes authenticity
during the conversation so that the participants are assured that the messages they see are authentic and are
not modified by anyone [20]. Deniability can be divided into three different parts:
1. Message Unlinkability: If a judge is convinced that a participant authored one message in the conver-
sation, it does not provide evidence that they authored other messages.
2. Message Repudiation: Given a conversation transcript and all cryptographic keys, there is no evidence
that a given message was authored by any particular user. We assume the accuser has access to the
session keys, but not the other participants’ long-term secret keys.
3. Participation Repudiation: Given a conversation transcript and all cryptographic key material for all
but one accused (honest) participant, there is no evidence that the honest participant was in a conversa-
tion with any of the other participants.
Synchronicity: There are two types of communication, synchronous and asynchronous. Synchronous protocols
require all participants to be online for them to receive or send messages. Chat applications are traditionally
synchronous communications. Alternatively, asynchronous messaging means that the participants do not
need to be online to receive messages, such as SMS text messaging or emails, since there is a third party,
like a server, to save the information until the recipient gets online again. Modern chat protocols do not
use synchronous protocols, usually because of social or technical constraints, such as device battery, limited
reception or other social happenings which do not allow people to be constantly online to receive messages.
That is why the majority of Instant Messaging (IM) solutions provide an asynchronous environment by
having a third party server to store the messages until the other participant gets online to receive it.
Group Chat Properties: Group conversations are popular nowadays, e.g., using Facebook Messenger6, Slack7 or
other popular messaging applications8. Security properties in the context of group chats include:
1. Computational Equality: Do the participants share an equal computational load when talking to each
other.
2. Trust Equality: No single participant has more trust or responsibility, within the group, than any other.
3. Subgroup Messaging: Participants can send messages to only a subgroup without generating a new
conversation.
4. Contractible Membership: No need to restart the security protocol when a member leaves the con-
versation.
5. Expandable Membership: There is no need to restart the security protocol when adding a new member
after the group has been generated.
It is important to be able to change the cryptographic keys when a new user joins the secure group conver-
sation, since then the new users will not have the ability to decrypt previously exchanged messages. New
cryptographic keys should also be exchanged when a user leaves the conversation. Changing the keys can
6https://www.messenger.com
7https://slack.com
8https://www.engadget.com/2016/09/30/12-most-used-messaging-apps/
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easily be done by restarting the protocol, but this is often computationally expensive. Protocols which offer
contractible and expandable memberships usually achieve these features without restarting the protocol.
Other Security Properties: A protocol or application for end-to-end secure IM may implement any (if not all) of
the following.
1. Participant Consistency: At any point when a message is accepted by an honest party, all honest
parties are guaranteed to have the same view of the participant list.
2. Destination Validation: When a message is accepted by an honest party, they can verify that they were
included in the set of intended recipients for the message.
3. Anonymity Preserving: Any anonymity features provided by the underlying transport privacy archi-
tecture (like the Tor9 network [14, 36]) are not undermined (e.g., if the transport privacy system provides
anonymity, the conversation security level does not deanonymize users by linking key identifies).
4. Speaker Consistency: All participants agree on the sequence of messages sent by each participant. A
protocol might perform consistency checks on blocks of messages during the protocol, or after every
message is sent.
5. Causality Preserving: Implementations can avoid displaying a message before messages that causally
precede it.
6. Global Transcript: All participants see all messages in the same order. When this security feature is
assured, it implies both speaker consistency and causality preserving are assured.
2.3 Properties for Usability and Adoption
Various aspects need to be taken into account when looking at usability and adoption of a secure IM application.
1. Out-of-order Resilience: If a message is delayed in transit, but eventually arrives, its contents are accessible
upon arrival.
2. Dropped Message Resilient: Messages can be decrypted without receipt of all previous messages. This is
desirable for asynchronous and unreliable network services.
3. Asynchronous: Messages can be sent securely to devices which are not connected to the Internet at the time
of sending.
4. Multi-Device Support: A user can connect to the conversation from multiple devices at the same time, and
have the same view of the conversation as the others.
5. No Additional Service: The protocol does not require any infrastructure other than the protocol participants.
Specifically, the protocol must not require additional servers for relaying messages or storing any kind of key
material.
2.4 Off-the-Record in a nut shell
Intuitively, the Off-the-Record (OTR) protocol [8, 44, 12, 1, 5, 30, 22] wants to provide for online conversations
the same features that reporters want when talking with a news source. Take a scenario where Alice and Bob are
alone in a room. Nobody can hear what they are saying to each other unless someone records them. No one knows
what they talk about, unless Alice and Bob tell them, and no one can prove that what they said is true, not even
themselves. A good thing about an Off-the-Record conversation (in reality) is the legal support behind it since
it is illegal to record conversations without participants knowing. It also applies to conversations over the phone,
since by law, it is illegal to tap phone lines. There are however no similar laws for communications over the web.
OTR-like protocols aim to provide this using cryptography techniques, and thus need to provide at least perfect
forward secrecy and deniability/repudiation. Full details can be found in [39, Sec.2.4].
9https://www.torproject.org/
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Step 1: Authenticated Key Exchange The latest version of OTR [21] use a variation of Diffie-Hellman Key
Exchanged called SIGMA [29]. Alice and Bob also have long-term authentication public keys pubA and pubB,
respectively. The point is to do an unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange to set up an encrypted channel,
and inside that channel do mutual authentication. The plain Diffie-Hellman key exchange is vulnerable to man-
in-the-middle attacks which would break the authentication that OTR needs [12]. Therefore, OTR implements a
signature-based authenticated DH exchange, named SIGMA, which solves this weakness [29].
The SIGMA acronym is short for “SIGn-and-MAc,” because SIGMA decouples the authentication of the DH
exponentials from the binding of key and identities. The former authentication task is performed using digital
signatures while the latter is done by computing a MAC function keyed via the common DH secretand applied to
the sender’s identity [29]. OTR uses a four message variant known as SIGMA-R, since it provides defence both
against active attacks on the responder’s identity and passive attacks on the initiator’s identity.
Step 2: Message Transmission The message transmission step, before sending, performs encryption and au-
thentication of messages using AES [11] in counter mode [16] using message authentication codes (HMAC) [4]
for authentication. Using AES in counter mode provides a malleable encryption scheme which allows deniabil-
ity. Malleability allows to transform a ciphertext into another ciphertext which then decrypts to a related plaintext
[12]. This means that a valid ciphertext cannot be connected with neither Alice nor Bob since anyone can create a
ciphertext that can be decrypted correctly and then compute a valid MAC from the ciphertext, because old MAC
keys are published (more about this in step 4). Entire new messages, or full transcripts, can thus be forged.
For sending messages Alice needs to compute an Encryption Key and a MAC Key. The encryption key is used
to encrypt the message while the MAC key is used to ensure the authenticity of the message. This method is
called encrypt-then-mac, where usually the encryption key is a hash of the shared secret, EK = Hash(SS), and then
the encryption key is hashed a second time to compute the MAC key (MK = Hash(EK)). After the encryption
and MAC key are computed, Alice encrypts first the message, EncEK(M) and then MACs the encrypted message,
MAC(EncEK(M),MK). Bob computes the same EK and MK from the common secret, used to verify the MAC and
decrypt the message.
Step 3: Re-key Off-the-Record changes the keys every time the conversation changes directions, to make the
duration of vulnerability to attacks as short as possible. Once the new key is established it will be used to encrypt
and authenticate new messages, while the previous ones are erased [12]. After establishing new secrets and keys,
the partners erase the old secret SS and encryption key EK, so that no one can forge or decrypt the messages that
have been sent. The reason to securely erase this information is to get perfect forward secrecy. The MK key is not
erased, but published in the next step.
Step 4: Publish MK The next step of OTR is to publish the old MAC keys by adding them to the next message
that Alice or Bob sends to each other, in plaintext. Alice and Bob both know that they have moved over to MK′,
hence if one of them receives a message with the old MK, they will know that the message has been forged.
Publishing MK allows others to forge transcripts of conversations between Alice and Bob. This is useful since it
provides extra deniability to both parties [33]. In short, Alice’s secrecy relies on Bob deleting the encryption keys,
whereas Alice’s deniability relies only on Alice publishing her MK.
Socialist Millionaire Protocol The problem with secure instant messaging is that there is no way to tell if there
has been a Man-In-The-Middle attack. Therefore, the parties need to make sure they have the same secret which
is done using the Socialist Millionaire Protocol (SMP) [26, 46]. Intuitively, SMP allows two millionaires who
want to exchange information to see whether they are equally rich, without revealing anything about the fortunes
themselves. Between Alice and Bob the SMP allows to know whether ssA = ssB, i.e., the respective computed
secrets, without revealing these secrets to anyone [1].
C. Johansen, A. Mujaj, H. Arshad, J. Noll 9
2.5 Signal in a nut shell
Signal is a new end-to-end encryption protocol which has recently seen larger adoption than the Off-the-Record
protocol. OTR had an original feature, i.e., refresh the message encryption keys often, which has became known as
ratcheting and adopted in Signal as well [10]. The Signal Protocol is designed by Moxie Marlinspike and Trevor
Perrin from Open Whisper Systems10 to work in both synchronous and asynchronous messaging environments.11
The goals of Signal include end-to-end encryption and advanced security properties such as forward secrecy and
future secrecy [10]. Initially, Signal was divided into two different application, TextSecure12 and RedPhone13. The
former was for SMS and instant messaging, while the latter was an encrypted VoIP14 application. TextSecure was
based on the OTR protocol, extending the ratcheting into a Double Ratchet, combining OTR’s asymmetric ratchet
with a symmetric ratchet [10], and naming it Axolotl Ratchet. Open Whisper Systems later combined TextSecure
and RedPhone to form the new Signal application that implements the protocol with the same name.
In recent years, the Signal Protocol has been adopted by numerous companies, such as WhatsApp15 by Face-
book, the Messenger16 also by Facebook, and Google’s new messaging app, Allo17.
Signal uses the Double Ratchet algorithm [34] to exchange encrypted messages based on a shared secret key
that the two parties have. To agree on the shared secret key Signal uses the X3DH Key Agreement [35] Protocol
(standing for Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman18) which we describe later in section 2.5.3. Full details can be found
in [39, Chap.3].
2.5.1 The Double Ratchet Algorithm
The Double Ratchet Algorithm uses Key Derivation Function Chains (KDF Chains) [34] to constantly derive keys
for encrypting each message, and it combines two different ratchet algorithms, a symmetric-key ratchet for deriv-
ing keys for sending and receiving messages, and a Diffie-Hellman ratchet used to provide secure inputs to the
symmetric-key ratchet.
A KDF Chain is a sequencing of applications of a Key Derivation Function which returns one key used as a
new KDF key for the next chain cycle as well as an output key for messages. The KDF Chain has the following
important properties [34]:
• Resilience: The output keys appear random to an adversary without knowledge of the KDF keys, even if the
adversary has control of the KDF inputs.
• Forward security: Output keys from the past appear random to an adversary who learns the KDF key at
some future point.
• Break-in recovery: Future output keys appear random to an adversary who learns the KDF key at some
point in time, provided the future inputs have added sufficient entropy.
The Double Ratchet generates and maintains keys of each party for three chains: a root chain, a sending chain,
and a receiving chain (Alice’s sending chain matches Bob’s receiving chain, and vice versa; see Figure1a). While
the parties exchange messages, they also exchange new Diffie-Hellman public keys. The secrets from the Diffie-
Hellman ratchet output become the inputs to the root chain of the KDF chain, and then the output keys from the
10https://whispersystems.org/
11Advanced Ratcheting, by Moxie Marlinspike at Open Whisper Systems, November 26 2013, https://whispersystems.org/blog/
advanced-ratcheting/
12https://whispersystems.org/blog/the-new-textsecure/
13https://whispersystems.org/blog/low-latency-switching/
14https://www.voip-info.org/wiki/view/What+is+VOIP
15https://whatsapp.com
16https://messenger.com
17https://allo.google.com
18https://whispersystems.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/
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(a) Sending and receiving chains. (b) First double ratchet message key A1 for Alice.
Figure 1: Signal double ratchet Key-Derivation Function (KDF) Chains; (reproduced from [34]).
root chain become new KDF keys for the sending and receiving chains, which need to advance for each sending
and receiving message. This is called the symmetric-key ratchet.
The output keys from the symmetric-key ratchet are unique message keys which are used to either encrypt or
decrypt messages. The sending and receiving chains ensure that each message is encrypted or decrypted with a
unique key which can be deleted after use. The message keys are not used to derive new message keys or chaining
keys. Because of this, it is possible to store the message key without affecting the security of other keys, only
the message that belongs to the particular message key may be read if this key is compromised. This is useful
for handling out-of-order messages because a participant can store the message key and decrypt the message later
when they receive the respective message. See more about out-of-order messages in Section 2.5.2.
The Double Ratchet is formed by combining the symmetric-key ratchet and the Diffie-Hellman ratchet. If the
Double Ratchet did not use the Diffie-Hellman ratchet to compute new chain keys for the sending and receiving
chain keys, an attacker that can steal one of the chain keys can then compute all future message keys and decrypt
all future messages [34].
Each party generates a DH key pair, a public and a private key, which will be their first ratchet key pair. When
a message is sent, the header must contain the current public key. When a message is received, the receiver checks
the public keys that are given with the message and do a DH ratchet step to replace the receiver’s existing ratchet
key pair with a new one [34].
The result is a kind of “ping-pong” behaviour as the two parties take turns replacing their key pairs. An attacker
that compromises one message key has little use of it since this will soon be replaced with a new, unrelated key
[34]. The DH ratchet produces as output the sending and the receiving chain keys, which have to correspond, i.e.,
the sending chain of one party is the same as the receiving chain of the other party (see Figure1a). Using a KDF
chain here improves the resilience and break-in recovery.
Combining the symmetric-key ratchet and Diffie-Hellman ratchet is as follows. (A) When a message is sent or
received, a symmetric-key ratchet step is applied to the sending or receiving chain to derive the message key. (B)
When a new ratchet public key is received, a DH ratchet step is performed prior to the symmetric-key ratchet to
replace the chain keys.
Fig. 1b shows the information used by Alice to send her first message to Bob. The sending chain key (CK)
is used on a symmetric-key ratchet step to derive a new CK and a message key, A1, to encrypt her message. The
new CK is stored for later use, while the old CK and the message key can be deleted. To ensure that the secrecy
throughout the Double Ratchet is upheld, the old root key (RK) is deleted after it has been used to derive a new RK.
Fig. 2a shows the computations that Alice does when receiving a response from Bob, which includes his new
ratchet public key. Alice applies a new DH ratchet step to derive a new receiving and sending chain keys. The
receiving CK is used to derive a new receiving CK and a message key, B1, to decrypt Bob’s message. Then she
derives a new DH output for the next root KDF chain with her new ratchet private key to derive a new RK and a
sending CK.
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(a) First receiving double ratchet message key B1 computed by Alice. (b) Handling of Out-of-Order Messages.
Figure 2: Signal more advanced aspects of the Double Ratchet protocol; (reproduced from [34]).
2.5.2 Out-of-Order Messages
The Double Ratchet handles lost or out-of-order messages by including in each message header the message’s
number in the sending chain (N) and the length (number of message keys) in the previous sending chain (PN) [34].
This allows the receiver to advance the keys to the relevant message key, while still storing the skipped message
keys in case they receive an older message at a later time. Consider the example from Fig. 2b where we assume that
Alice has already received message B1, and now she receives message B4 from Bob, with the PN = 2 and N = 1.
Alice sees that she would need to do a DH ratchet step, but first, she calculates how many message keys she needs
to store from her current receiving chain (Bob’s previous sending chain). Since PN = 2 and her current receiving
chain length is 1, the number of stored keys from the current receiving chain is 1 message key (i.e., B2). Then she
does a DH ratchet step where a new receiving chain is derived. Because the length of her new receiving chain is 0,
she needs to store a message key from her new receiving chain (i.e., B3). After Alice has stored B2 and B3, she
can derive the last message key to decrypt message B4.
2.5.3 The X3DH Key Agreement Protocol
For Signal the X3DH is designed for asynchronous settings where one user, Bob, is offline but has published
information to a server, and another user, Alice, wants to use that information to send encrypted data to Bob [35].
The Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol (X3DH) thus establishes a shared secret between two
parties who mutually authenticate each other based on public keys, and at the same time provides both forward
secrecy and cryptographic deniability.
To provide asynchrony, a server is used to store messages from Alice and Bob which later can be retrieved; and
the same server keeps the sets of keys for Alice and Bob to retrieve when needed [35]. The X3DH Protocol has
three different phases:
1. Bob publishes his elliptic curve public keys to the server: (i) Bob’s identity key IKB, (ii) Bob’s signed prekey
SPKB, (iii) a set of Bob’s one-time prekeys (OBK1B, OBK
2
B, OBK
3
B, . . . ). Identity keys need to be uploaded to
the server once, while the other keys, such as new one-time prekeys can be uploaded again later if the server
is getting low. The server will delete a one-time prekey each time it sends it to another user.
2. Alice fetches from the server Bob’s identity key, signed prekey, prekey signature, and optionally a single
one-time prekey. If the verification of the prekey signature fails the protocol is aborted. Otherwise, Alice
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Table 1: Comparison of secure messaging protocols (reproduced from [45]).
: Provides the property; : Partially provides the property; : Does not provide the property.
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generates an ephemeral key pair with her public key EKA, and will use the prekey to calculate several DH
keys with the purpose to provide mutual authentication and forward secrecy (see details in [35]) used to
generate the secret key for encryption (SK). After calculating the SK, Alice will delete her ephemeral private
key and the DH outputs to preserve secrecy.
Alice uses the key to send an initial message to Bob containing: (i) Alice’s identity key IKA; (ii) Alice’s
ephemeral key EKA; (iii) Identifiers stating which of Bob’s prekeys Alice used; (iv) An initial ciphertext
encrypted with some AEAD encryption scheme [40] using AD as associated data and using an encryption
key which is either SK or the output from some cryptographic pseudo-random function keyed by SK. Alice’s
initial ciphertext is typically used as the first message in a post-X3DH communication protocol, such as the
Double Ratchet protocol in the case of Signal.
3. Bob receives and processes Alice’s initial message. Bob will load his identity private key and the private
key(s) corresponding to the signed prekey and one-time prekey that Alice used [35]. Bob repeats the same
steps with DH and KDF calculations to derive his own SK and then deletes the DH values, the same as Alice
did. Afterwards, he tries to decrypt the initial ciphertext. The decryption is the only difference between what
Bob does and what Alice did on her side. If the decryption fails, Bob will delete the SK and the protocol
aborts, and the participants need to restart the protocol [35]. If the decryption is successful, he gets the
information that Alice had encrypted, and the protocol is complete for Bob. He deletes any one-time prekey
private key that was used during the protocol in order to uphold the forward secrecy.
2.6 Security properties of protocols for end-to-end encrypted instant messaging
Table 1 shows that none of the secure messaging protocols we have gone through in this section can give the users
every security property (for more information about the definition of the properties used in Table 1 please refer to
[45]). In this section we briefly comment on each of these, including for completeness also the Matrix19 as a major
protocol.
19Matrix protocol having several IM implementations; at https://matrix.org
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While the Off-the-Record protocol does not need any additional services or servers, it cannot provide group
conversation (in the current version and implementations). There have been research works investigating group
conversations on top of OTR [5, 30, 22], but they have not received enough attention from the developers mainly
because these do not support asynchronous chat conversations. While Signal supports desktops through the Chrome
Extensions, it does not support native desktop application. Moreover, it only allows for one device to be used, i.e.,
multiple mobile phones cannot be added to a user’s account. This could be achieved using the same functionality
for group conversations, but efficiency could be a problem.
The Matrix protocols and application (see Section 2.6.3 for details) supports multiple devices, without affecting
the efficiency of the conversations. However, it does not achieve full forward and backward secrecy in the protocols,
but the implementation does. The Signal protocol has been audited by two research groups in 2017 [10, 28] and
since it is open source, the community can improve it. The Matrix protocol has also been audited [3]. This indicates
that researchers are taking these protocols seriously and want to strengthen their credibility.
2.6.1 Off-the-Record
OTR uses an encrypt-then-MAC approach to protect messages (see Section 2.4 for details) which provides con-
fidentiality, integrity, and authentication. The SIGMA protocol (a variant of authenticated Diffie-Hellman key
exchange) ensures participation consistency for the key exchange [29]. Forward secrecy is ensured by the fact that
message keys are regularly replaced with new key material during the conversation. Backward secrecy is ensured
by the fact that message keys are computed by new DH values which are advertised by the sender with each sent
message. Anonymity preservation is ensured by the fact that the long-term public keys are never observed, neither
during the key exchange nor during the conversation. Causality preservation is only partially achieved, as messages
implicitly reference their causal predecessors based on which keys they use [45]. Speaker consistency is only par-
tially achieved since an adversary cannot drop messages without also dropping all future messages, for otherwise
the recipients would not be able to decrypt subsequent messages [45]. The aftermath of the speaker consistency
is that the recipient needs to save out-of-order messages because if they do not come in order the message will be
encrypted with an unexpected key, and at the same time the window of compromises enlarges, and the OTR would
end up only partially providing the forward secrecy. Out-of-order and dropped messages are only partially provided
because if a message is out-of-order or dropped during the transmission, the protocol can store the decryption key
until the participant receives that message. The problem of storing the decryption key is that it raises the possibility
of successful attacks on the client side.
The OTR protocol signs the messages with the shared MAC keys and not the long-term keys. To strengthen
the message unlinkability and message repudiation features, OTR uses malleable encryption and the MAC keys are
published after each message exchange [8]. OTR only signs the ephemeral keys and not every parameter during
the key exchange, which provides only partial participation repudiation since the conversation partners can use
the signed ephemeral keys to forge transcripts. The OTR protocol is intended for instant messaging, and thus
does not provide asynchronous messaging. However, the synchronous only requirement allows OTR to not rely on
additional services for establishing a connection between two participants.
2.6.2 Signal
The design of the Signal protocol extends OTR, thus maintaining the same security features, while in some cases
adding stronger or new features as well. Forward secrecy is provided because of the use of thee KDF ratchets,
whereas backward secrecy is provided because even when KDF keys are comprised, they are soon replaced by new
keys. The X3DH handshake (Section 2.5.3) provides the same level of authentication as the SIGMA from OTR,
but X3DH achieves full participation repudiation since anybody can forge a transcript between two parties [45].
However, Signal fails to provide anonymity preserving because X3DH uses the long-term public keys during the
initial key agreement. The prekeys are used to provide an asynchronous messaging system by sending a set of
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prekeys to a central server, and then a sender can request the next prekey for the receiver to compute encryption
keys. By using a central server to keep the prekeys, the Signal protocol loses the no additional service property.
Out-of-order and dropped messages are fully supported on one-to-one conversations asynchronously by the use of
prekeys.
Group conversation is achieved by using multicast encryption, which when sending a single encrypted message
to the group, it is sent to a server and then relays it to the other participants while the decryption key is sent as a
standalone message to each member of the group conversation. The group conversation provides asynchronous
messaging, speaker consistency, and causality preservation, by attaching message identifiers, of the messages be-
fore, to the new message [45], but it cannot guarantee participant consistency. Multi-device is partly provided, in
the sense that only an extra computer can join in a conversation by using the Signal Desktop application20, which
is only a Chrome Extension21 and not an own application.
The Signal protocol provides computational and trust equality, subgroup messaging, contractible and expand-
able membership properties. By using pairwise group messaging and multicast encryption, Signal has the ability
to push group management into the client apps, which makes it easier for the users to change the group, expand
it or shrink it in size, without having to restart the whole group conversation and protocol. When users want to
send a group message they send a message to each of the users that are participating and adding a parameter to
the header marking that it is meant for the specific group chat. The Signal server does not know about the group
conversation, since the messages are encrypted using their normal public key. The pairwise group messaging also
makes the computation of new cryptographic keys and trust equality as computationally demanding as if there was
only a one-to-one conversation.
2.6.3 Matrix
The Matrix protocol consists of two different algorithms, the Olm22 for one-to-one conversations and Megolm23
for group conversations between multiple devices. The Olm algorithm is based on the Signal protocol, which
means they achieve the same security properties as Signal does, while the Megolm algorithm is a new AES-
based cryptographic ratchet developed for group conversations. Multiple devices are possible with Matrix because
Megolm implements a separate ratchet per sending device that is participating in a group conversation.24 The
protocol does not restart when the ratchet is replaced with a new one, which provides computational and trust
equality, subgroup messaging, contractible and expandable membership properties.
The NCC Group has audited both algorithms [3] and found that Megolm has some security flaws about forward
and future secrecy. If an attacker manages to compromise the key to Megolm sessions, then it can decrypt any
future messages sent to the participants in a group conversation. The Matrix SDK, which is used in the applications
that have implemented the Matrix protocol such as Riot25; ensures that the Megolm keys get refreshed after a
certain amount of messages. Forward secrecy is only partially provided since the Megolm maintains a record of
the ratchet value which allows them to decrypt any messages sent in the session after the corresponding point in
the conversation. The Matrix developers have stated that this is intentionally designed [25], but also said that it is
up to the application to offer the user the option to discard old conversations.
20https://whispersystems.org/blog/signal-desktop/
21https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser_extension
22https://matrix.org/docs/spec/olm.html
23https://matrix.org/docs/spec/megolm.html
24Matrix.org Launches Cross-platform Beta of End-to-End Encryption Following Security Assessment by NCC Group https://pr.
blonde20.com/matrix-e2e/
25https://about.riot.im/
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3 Analysis of Applications Implementing Secure Messaging
This section surveys applications (mostly smartphone apps) that advertise secure messaging conversation capabili-
ties between one-to-one and/or many-to-many users. We investigate a set of usability properties relevant for secure
messaging.
3.1 Test Scenarios
We first explain in this subsection the test scenarios that we carried and the security and usability properties we
are looking for. The test scenarios are the same for each application, and screenshots were taken during the testing
phases to gather enough information for later analysis. We are going to study a set of properties in each test
scenario, chosen to discover how secure and usable each application is. The test scenarios that the applications are
going through are described in the following subsections.
3.1.1 Initial Set Up
This test scenario includes two stages: “Setup and Registration” and “Initial Contact”. Stage one is the first process
a user needs to go through after installing an application. Here we test how the applications handle the registration
process, what the user needs to do to register a new account, and whether there are multiple ways to register. The
properties of interest are:
• Phone registration: User can register an account with a phone number.
• E-mail registration: User can register an account with an e-mail address.
• Verification by SMS: Receive verification code through SMS.
• Verification by Phone Call: Receive verification code through a phone call.
• Access SMS inbox: The app requires access to the SMS Inbox in order to read the verification code auto-
matically.
• Contact list upload: The app requires to upload contacts to a server in order to see if others are using the
same application.
Stage two examines how applications handle the first message sent from one participant to another, whether
the participants are informed of the secure messaging capabilities or whether the app shows how the cryptographic
keys are used. Properties:
• Trust-On-First-Use: Automatically verify each other on initiation.
• Notification About E2E Encryption: The app presents notifications to explain to the user that messages are
encrypted.
3.1.2 Message After a Key Change
This scenario tests how the application handles changes of cryptographic keys after Bob deletes the application in
the middle of a conversation with Alice. After Bob has reinstalled his application, Alice sends him a new message
and examines if the application gives Alice any information about the key changes. When a user deletes a secure
messaging application, the cryptographic keys are normally deleted from the device to strengthen the security of
the messages the participant has already sent. When a participant then reinstalls the application, a new set of
cryptographic keys are generated. Properties of interest are:
• Notification about key changes: Notifies Alice that Bob has changed cryptographic keys.
• Blocking message: Blocks new messages from being sent until Alice and Bob verify each other.
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3.1.3 Key Change While a Message is in Transit
Cryptographic key changes while a message is in transit is similar to the test scenario before; however, we are
interested in what happens when a message is lost before new keys are generated. Bob deletes his application
without telling Alice; she then sends Bob a message, but the message is lost in transit. Properties of interest are:
• Re-encrypt and send message: Does the application re-encrypt the message and sends it again after the
receiver has generated new cryptographic keys or is the message lost forever?
• Details about transmission of message: Users can see the difference between sent and delivered messages.
3.1.4 Verification Process Between Participants
In a conversation, Alice and Bob want to verify each other to ensure that they are having a conversation with honest
participants. This test scenario looks at how the verification process works and if it is a secure and usable method
of doing it.
• QR-code: Verify each other through a QR-code.
• Verify by Phone call: Call each other with E2E-encrypted phone call and read keys out loud.
• Share keys through 3rd party: Share the keys through other applications.
• Verified check: Users can check later if a specific user is already verified.
3.1.5 Other Security Implementations
Each application may have additional security and privacy features meant to protect from various intrusions or
attacks.
• Passphrase/code: Possibility of a passphrase/code that only the user knows and enters to access the appli-
cation.
• Two-step verification: When registering after a reinstall or new device, then a second passphrase/code is
needed which only the specific user knows.
• Screen security: The user is not allowed to screenshot within the application.
• Clear trusted contacts: Can all verified contacts be cleared, which means the user needs to verify each
contact again?
• Delete devices from account: If the application allows multiple devices, is there an option to delete devices
which are not in use anymore.
3.2 Running The Different Test Cases
3.2.1 Case 1: Signal
Signal is an instant messaging application as well as a voice calling application, for both Android and iOS. What
sets the Signal application apart from the other applications, except for Riot, is the fact that it is completely open
source. This reassures people that it does what the developers claim, since anyone can audit the source code as well
as the employed cryptographic protocols.
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(a) phone number registration (b) verifying the phone number
Figure 3: Signal: registration process
Initial Set Up: An account can be registered to one
device at a time, which means that using the same num-
ber on a second device, will automatically deactivate the
first device, to strengthen the security and to keep the
private cryptographic keys on one device only. Fig. 3a
shows the first view a user sees when opening the app
for the first time. Twilio is used for handling the SMS
verification process with the Signal server when regis-
tering an account. Contact information are transmitted
to the server, but are not stored.
Fig. 3b explains the different steps the Signal app
goes through to register and verify a new user account.
The verification code is sent as an SMS, and the app
reads the SMS automatically to verify the new user. Af-
ter the verification, the app generates new device cryp-
tographic keys. At the end, the app registers the account
within the Signal server. If the user does not give the ap-
plication access to their SMS inbox, then it has to wait
for the SMS verification timer to time out, as shown at
the bottom of Fig. 3b, after which the Signal application calls the user and gives out a verification number to be
typed in manually.
(a) Alice’s first message (b) Message after reinstall (c) Verifying Bob again
(d) Message after verification
Figure 4: Signal: Message after key change
Message After a Key Change: This test scenario analyses what happens when cryptographic keys change, e.g.,
when a user in a conversation deletes and then reinstalls the Signal app. Fig. 4a shows the first two messages that
Alice sends to Bob. The double checkmark shown on each message indicates that it has been received and read by
Bob. The lock indicates that the message is encrypted from one end to the other, and nobody in between can read
it. Fig. 4b shows when Alice sends Bob another message after he has deleted and reinstalled his Signal app. The
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application notifies Alice that the message has not been delivered with a red notification icon on the left. It also
gives information that by pressing on the message the user can get more details about the notification.
Fig. 4c is the view the user sees when pressing the message that was not delivered. Alice is presented with
information that Bob has a new security number (cryptographic keys), and she needs to verify the new keys to get
the ability to send any new message to Bob. After the verification process between Alice and Bob is done, they
can continue the conversation, and a notification is posted in the conversation that Bob has changed his security
number, as shown in Fig. 4d.
(a) Message before key change (b) Message after key change
Figure 5: Signal: Key change while a message is in
transit
Key Change While a Message is in Transit: This test
scenario is mostly the same as the previous one, with
the difference that here we want to check what does the
Signal app do when a message is sent before Bob has
managed to reinstall his Signal application, i.e., handling
of messages lost in transit.
Fig. 5a shows the initialization of the conversation.
Fig. 5b shows the conversation after a couple of mes-
sages from Alice to Bob. The second message is sent
after Bob has deleted his application, and there is only
a single checkmark on that message, which means the
message has been sent, but not received. The icons
on the third message indicate that Bob has finally rein-
stalled, but he never received the second message which
was sent before he reinstalled. After Alice and Bob ver-
ify their new security number, all new messages are re-
ceived and encrypted by both sides, but the second mes-
sage is never received. The reason for never receiving
the second message in Fig. 5b is because the Signal app
never stores messages that are encrypted after they are sent to the server, and the messages are never re-encrypted
by Alice when Bob has changed his cryptographic keys.
(a) Verification page (b) Verified
Figure 6: Signal: verification process
Verification Process Between Participants: Signal
supports three different methods for the users to verify
each other. The first verification process uses the built-
in calling option of Signal which is end-to-end encrypted
and then read out loud to the other participant the secu-
rity numbers that are shown in Fig. 6a. If the Signal
calling is not regarded as secure enough, users can meet
in person and show the numbers to each other.
The second method, shown in Fig. 6a, uses the built-
in QR-code scanner to scan the other participants QR-
code to verify it is the same person in the chat. The third
option to verify the other user is meant to be used when
the users do not trust the Signal application for handling
the verification process. It is possible to share the secu-
rity numbers to other applications on the user’s phone.
The user may have PGP26 [47, 19] enabled e-mail on
26https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy
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their phone, and they trust it more than the Signal appli-
cation, then this method is a better way of verifying the
other user.
Other Security Implementations: The Signal application has extra privacy settings. The first is the “Safety
numbers approval” as shown in Fig. 7a. The setting is activated by default, which is important. When a user
changes the safety numbers (cryptographic keys) by deleting and reinstalling the app, the device keys will also
change. When the device keys change, the messages will not be shown to the receiver on a new device, until the
new safety numbers are approved. The second privacy setting is “Screen security”, which does not allow the user
to take screenshots as long as they are inside the Signal application.
The last privacy setting is the ability to enable a passphrase. The passphrase locks the Signal application and
all message notifications. It is possible to add an inactivity timeout passphrase which locks the application after
some given time. Fig. 7b shows the notification which is locked and when the user tries to open the application,
she needs to enter their passphrase they chose when the setting was activated.
3.2.2 Case 2: WhatsApp
(a) Privacy settings (b) Notification locked
Figure 7: Signal: other security implementations
WhatsApp started as a small company in 2009, bought
by Facebook in 2014 when it had 465 million monthly
active users, and in 2017 that number has grown to 1.5
billion.27 WhatsApp initially was only a cross-platform
non-secure instant messaging, but by the end of 2014
they announced that every user was going to start send-
ing end-to-end encrypted messages using the Signal pro-
tocol.28 This was an important step for the Signal pro-
tocol and Open Whisper Systems since now the most
popular instant messaging application would use their
protocol. In April 2016 a complete transition was made
from non-secure messaging to fully end-to-end encryp-
tion.29
Initial Set Up: Establishing an account on WhatsApp
is done in the same way as for the Signal application,
where the account only works on one device at a time.
Fig. 8a shows the first page a user sees when starting the application for the first time. WhatsApp uses its own
infrastructure to handle the SMS verification process instead of a third party.Fig. 8b shows the verification page
after the user has entered her phone number. WhatsApp automatically enters the verification code that is sent to
the user’s SMS inbox, but if the user has not given the app access to the inbox, she can enter the verification code
manually. If for some reason the verification code does not arrive, the user has the options to either resend the SMS
or ask WhatsApp to call the user to receive the verification code through voice.
27The Statistics Portal: “Number of monthly active Whatsapp users worldwide from April 2013 to December 2017 (in millions)” https:
//www.statista.com/statistics/260819/number-of-monthly-active-whatsapp-users/
28“Open Whisper Systems partners with WhatsApp to provide end-to-end encryption”, announced by Moxie Marlinspike from Open
Whisper Systems on November 18 2014, at https://whispersystems.org/blog/whatsapp/
29“WhatsApps’s Signal Protocol integration is now complete”, announced by Moxie Marlinspike from Open Whisper Systems on April
05 2016, at https://whispersystems.org/blog/whatsapp-complete/
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(a) Alice’s first message (b) After Bob has reinstalled (c) Info about Bob’s new keys (d) Message after verification
Figure 9: WhatsApp: message after a key change
(a) Phone number registration (b) Verifying the phone number
Figure 8: WhatsApp: registration process
Message After a Key Change: Fig. 9a shows when
Alice sends her first and second messages to Bob in or-
der to initiate a conversation. The yellow notification
box at the top of the conversation is shown to both par-
ticipants stating that the conversation is end-to-end en-
crypted and more information can be obtained by press-
ing the box. Each message is shown with a double
checkmark, as in Signal.
Fig. 9b shows a new notification box appearing on
Alice’s conversation page after Bob has reinstalled his
application. WhatsApp automatically checks if new
cryptographic keys (security code) are changed even
though she has not sent him any message.When Alice
taps the notification box, a popup (Fig. 9c) informs Alice
why Bob’s cryptographic keys have changed and the op-
tion to verify him before she sends new messages. Alice
sends a new message to Bob after verifying new crypto-
graphic keys of Bob and the message is labeled (Fig. 9d)
with a double checkmark meaning that everything went
well.
Key Change While a Message is in Transit: This test
scenario starts as the previous one, but here we look at
how WhatsApp handles messages sent before Bob fin-
ishes to reinstall. Fig. 10a shows Alice sending a second
message to Bob after he has deleted his application. The single checkmark on the message means that it has been
sent but not received and read by Bob. When Bob finishes the re-installation of the application, both the second
message Alice sent and the same yellow notification box are added to the conversation. Fig. 10b displays the con-
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(a) Privacy settings (b) Security notification (c) Two step verification
Figure 11: WhatsApp: other security implementations
versation after Alice sends a third message, showing that Bob receives the second message that was sent before he
reinstalled. This means that WhatsApp re-encrypts messages when the receiver generates new cryptographic keys
and the sender does not verify the new keys.
(a) Bob deletes his app (b) Bob reinstalled
Figure 10: WhatsApp: key change while msg. in transit
Verification Process Between Participants: What-
sApp has implemented the same verification process as
Signal. It uses the Signal numerical format for verifi-
cation, a QR-code for scanning with the built-in scan-
ner, and the user can choose if they want to copy the
security numbers outside of the WhatsApp application.
The reason for this may be that when they decided to
implement the Signal end-to-end security protocol, they
implemented every single step of the Signal implemen-
tation to uphold the specifications. WhatsApp also fea-
tures end-to-end encrypted calling, which enables users
to call each other and verify the security code.
Other Security Implementations: As shown in
Fig. 11a (setting page), there are options for changing
the number of the account or even delete the account.
If Alice chooses the “Security” menu item and then
activates the “show security notification” option (shown
in Fig. 11b), then when Bob re-installs the application or receives a new device the application shows a notification
to Alice. Otherwise, if the option is turned off, then Alice does not receive any notification.
Fig. 11c shows the two-step verification settings that WhatsApp has implemented, where the user needs to
enter an additional passphrase when registering the account with the same number on a new device or after a fresh
re-install.
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(a) Phone number registration (b) Phone verification (c) User login with e-mail (d) Login with phone number
Figure 12: Wire: registration process
3.2.3 Case 3: Wire
Wire is an application that implements end-to-end encryption using the Proteus protocol, which is heavily based on
the Signal protocol, but re-implemented in-house.30 Wire was started in 2012 by developers who previously worked
at Microsoft and Skype, and finally released their own instant messaging application in 2014.31 The first version
did not offer end-to-end encryption until March 2016, when they launched the encryption on instant messaging and
their video calling feature [2]. Wire offers the same features as the other applications, such as text, video, voice,
photo and music messages, and is supported on multiple platforms, from smartphones to personal computers, and
is also open sourced.32
Initial Set Up: The Wire app has a different registration process than the other applications. The first page, as
shown in Fig. 12a, asks to register a phone number. However, one can also create an account through the Wire web
application by using just an email address. Fig. 12b shows the verification process, where the user needs to enter the
verification code (which is received in an SMS) manually. If the user never receives the verification code, she can
ask Wire to call the user to receive it. Wire application does not read the code received in the SMS automatically.
Figures 12c and 12d demonstrate options to log in with an email and/or a phone number, respectively. When a user
reinstalls the application or changes her device, she does not need to go through the registration again.
Message After a Key Change: Fig. 13a shows Alice’s initial contact with Bob. Wire uses a text under each
message to explain if the message is delivered to the recipient or not. If the receiver re-installs his application
(which results in changing his cryptographic keys), then the sender (i.e., Alice) will not be notified by the Wire
application about the new cryptographic keys of the receiver. As shown in Fig. 13b, Alice sends two messages to
Bob, where Bob has reinstalled his application, but Alice does not get any notification by Wire that Bob has new
cryptographic keys; it may look to Alice that Bob has the same keys as before. Alice can check Bob’s account
30Proteus Protocol, by Wire Swiss GmbH available at https://github.com/wireapp/proteus
31“Skype Co-Founder Backs Wire, A New Communications App Launching Today On iOS, Android And
Mac, by Sarah Perez in Tech Crunch on December 2014 available at https://techcrunch.com/2014/12/02/
skype-co-founder-backs-wire-a-new-communications-app-launching-today-on-ios-android-and-mac/
32https://github.com/wireapp
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(a) Alice’s first message before
deletion
(b) After Bob has reinstalled
(c) No notification after Bob re-
installs
(d) Bob’s device keys
Figure 13: Wire: Key change while a message is in transit; and Message after a key change
information to see if Bob has got new cryptographic keys. Fig. 13d shows Bob’s device keys under his account,
for three different devices, because Wire allows multiple devices to be associated to one account. This means that
Alice needs to verify each device to know that the conversation is secure with end-to-end encryption. The two
top devices have a full blue shield which means they are verified, while the bottom device only has a half shield
because it has not been verified yet.
Key Change While a Message is in Transit: Fig. 13a shows the initial message from Alice to Bob. If Alice sends
a message when Bob has deleted the app, the message will be labeled by just “sent” and not delivered (Fig. 13c).
However, if Alice sends another message when Bob has reinstalled the app, then the message will be labeled as
“delivered”. This test demonstrates that Wire does not notify Alice about Bob’s new keys, and at the same time
does not deliver messages encrypted with old cryptographic keys to devices with new keys.
Verification Process Between Participants: Wire’s verification process does not offer the same options for ver-
ifying each participant as the other applications. However, because Wire allows several devices to be associated
with one account each user has access to the whole list of devices of another conversation party. When Alice wants
to verify one of Bob’s devices she can see Bob’s profile, and particularly the tab displaying information about all
his devices (Fig. 13d). If Alice taps on one of the devices from the list, as show in Fig. 14a, she can get some
information about the phone’s ID number and the public keys of that device. Alice can either call Bob over the
phone or meet him in person and then verify the keys. When the verification is done, Alice needs to toggle the “not
verified” switch to specify that this particular device is verified.
Other Security Implementations: Wire does not have the extra security implementations that Signal or What-
sApp have. The few options include a way to change how the message conversation looks and the possibility to add
an email to the account for easier log in. The user can look at the devices which have been used with her account
(as shown in Fig. 14b), and if there are any devices which the user does not own or recognize, she can delete that
specific device. After deleting a device, the user is prompted to change her password.
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(a) Bob’s public keys for one de-
vice
(b) Other security implementa-
tions
Figure 14: Wire: verification process
3.2.4 Case 4: Viber
Viber is another instant messaging application that was launched in 2010, and has become quite popular, with
800 million overall users and 266 million monthly active users [31]. Viber has properties similar to the other
applications, where users are capable of forming groups, send messages, call each other and send pictures, videos
or voice messages to other users of Viber.33 Viber works on smartphones and personal computers, which makes it
cross-platform. Viber did not have end-to-end encryption in the beginning, but introduced it in April 2016 for both
one-to-one and group conversations.34 Viber does not use the Signal protocol, but implements its own protocol,
which has the same concepts as the double-ratchet protocol used by Signal (as stated by its developers).
(a) Registration with phone
number
(b) Verification of phone number
Figure 15: Viber: registration process
Initial Set Up: The user registration process of Viber
is the same as that in the previous applications. Fig. 15a
shows the user input for the user’s phone number in the
registration screen. Fig. 15b shows the activation pro-
cess of the user account. The user can either give Viber
access to the SMS inbox to enter the verification code
automatically or do it manually otherwise. If the SMS
with the verification code does not arrive within one
minute, the user can ask the application to either resend
a new verification code or get the code through a phone
call.
Message After a Key Change: Viber does not no-
tify the participants when the cryptographic keys change
during a conversation. The first two messages in Fig. 16a
33Viber, by Rakuten Inc. https://www.viber.com/en/about
34“Giving Our Users Control Over Their Private Conversations”, by Michael Schmilov from Viber on April 19 2016, at https://www.
viber.com/en/blog/2016-04-19/giving-our-users-control-over-their-private-conversations
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(a) No notification about key
changes
(b) Bob needs to be re-trusted
(c) Message after Bob has
deleted
(d) Bob did not get the second
message
Figure 16: Viber: Message after a key change; and Key change while a message is in transit.
show Alice initiating the conversation with Bob. After
Bob has reinstalled the application, Alice sends him another message. However, Fig. 16a (third message) shows
that Viber does not give any notification to Alice that Bob has generated new cryptographic keys. The only way
for Alice to find out this is by checking the details of the conversation, by swiping from right to left. As shown in
Fig. 16b, if the “Trust this contact” tab has changed to “Re-trust this contact”, then Alice can infer that Bob has
new cryptographic keys that should be verified.
Key Change While a Message is in Transit: Key changes in transit are handled the same as key changes after
the reinstall of the application explained before. Fig. 16c shows that Alice sends a second message to Bob before
he has reinstalled his application, and there is no information given to Alice if the message is sent or read by Bob.
Fig. 16d shows the third message from Alice to Bob after he has reinstalled his application. Alice never receives
any notification from Viber that Bob has new cryptographic keys nor that he has not received the second message,
and Viber does not re-encrypt and re-send messages later on.
Verification Process Between Participants: The process of verifying a contact in Viber is quite straight forward.
If Alice wants to verify Bob, she goes to one of their conversations, swipes (Fig. 17a) to get the information tab,
and then goes to the “Trust this contact” option. Fig. 17b shows the popup notification box after Alice clicks the
“Trust this contact” option. The only verification option Alice can use to verify Bob is by calling Bob and then
read the cryptographic keys over the phone. Fig. 17c shows when Alice calls Bob and wants to verify, the popup
message displays the cryptographic keys that both Alice and Bob share. When they have verified each other, they
press the “Trust this contact” button.
Other Security Implementations: Viber does not have extra security implementations. Fig. 17d shows the
privacy settings where the only security implementation is the “Clear trusted contacts” which clears all the contacts
that Alice has verified throughout the time she had the account.
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(a) Conversation info (b) Verify a contact (c) Alice verifying Bob (d) Viber: Privacy settings
Figure 17: Viber: Verification process; and Privacy settings.
3.2.5 Case 5: Riot
Riot is a new chat client that is built on top of the Matrix35 protocol for its end-to-end encrypted capabilities. Matrix
is an open standard for decentralized communications which uses bridged networks and cross-platform possibilities
plus full end-to-end encryption that is based on the Double Ratchet protocol from Signal.
Riot uses servers (the same as Signal), but one does not need to rely on servers under the control of the Matrix
team (unlike Signal). Riot and Matrix are open source, which means anyone can set up their own servers with the
Matrix implementation and use its end-to-end encryption. This is good for companies that want to have secure chat
between employees but do not want to rely on anything outside their own network. Riot also provides group chat,
voice (VoIP) and video calling, file transfer and integration with other applications such as Slack36 or IRC37.
(a) Registration by email (b) Captcha code
Figure 18: Riot: registration process
Initial Set Up: Riot is the only messaging client that
does not rely on a phone number, but a user registers
an account with an email address (Fig. 18a). When a
user registers through the app, Riot sends a confirma-
tion link to the entered email address and the user has to
click on that link, after which a Captcha verification will
be requested for an extra layer of security as shown in
Fig. 18b.
Message After a Key Change: Riot is not the typical
instant messaging application such as Signal or What-
sApp. Their vision is to make an application which
works in the same way as Slack or IRC, where there are
chat rooms to join and talk to others. Therefore, Alice
35https://matrix.org/
36https://slack.com/
37https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Internet_Relay_Chat
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(a) Initial conversation, Alice’s
view
(b) Message to Bob after he re-
installed
(c) New messages are verified
(d) Bob’s view of previous mes-
sages
Figure 19: Riot: message after a key change
starts a chat room, invites Bob and then activates end-to-
end encryption. It should be noted that end-to-end encryption is still in beta form, and thus is not turned on by
default. Fig. 19a shows the chat room, which in the beginning has open locks on each of the messages from Alice
and Bob that have been sent before the encryption was toggled on. How the end-to-end encryption is toggled on
is shown in the “other security implementations” part (Fig.21d). When Alice sends her initial message to Bob, the
lock is changed to closed (Fig.20a) since E2E encryption is on. Fig. 19b shows that if Bob reinstalls his application,
he has to re-verify Alice because his device keys are changed. Alice can also see that she has to re-verify Bob as
the Bob’s message has a yellow notification triangle. When Alice verifies Bob, the messages are then listed with
a correct closed lock, which means that the messages are encrypted correctly (Fig. 19c). In Riot, when a new user
(or existing user with new keys) enters the chat room, she cannot read/access the previous messages (see Fig. 19d).
(a) Message before Bob rein-
stalled
(b) Bob’s message after reinstall
Figure 20: Riot: key change while a message is in
transit
Key Change While a Message is in Transit: Riot
handles key changes in the same way as the previous
subsection regardless of whether the message is in tran-
sit or not. When Bob deletes the application, Alice sends
the second message to Bob (Fig. 20a). Alice also sends
a third message to Bob when Bob reinstalls the applica-
tion. As shown in Fig. 20b, Bob can read just the third
message but not the second. This shows that Riot han-
dles the key changes in the same way as before, Bob can
see there were some messages sent, but cannot decrypt
since he lost the old keys.
Verification Process Between Participants: The ver-
ification process is rather easy in the Riot application.
Moreover, Riot gives considerable amounts of informa-
tion to the user about the users they interact with. When
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(a) Profile details (b) Verifying Bob the 2nd time (c) Verifying Bob
(d) Riot: Other security imple-
mentations
Figure 21: Riot: verification process
Alice wants to verify Bob’s devices, she needs to look at
his profile account to find Bob’s list of devices by clicking on the “Device” tab, as shown in Fig. 21a. One of Bob’s
devices in Fig. 21b has the yellow notification triangle, then that specific device has not been verified by Alice yet.
She can either verify the device or put it into the blacklist, as in Fig. 21c, which means that specific device is no
longer able to send any messages or invites to Alice.
If Alice decides to verify Bob’s device, she clicks on the verify button and sees the verification popup from
Fig. 21c. The popup is informative for users, but for some end-users it may have too much information and could
look cluttered. The popup states that the verification information and process will become more sophisticated in
future versions when the application starts to reach the end of the beta period. For the verification, Alice can either
call Bob or meet him in person and then exchanges the device keys. Finally, Alice needs to press the “I verify that
the keys match” button.
Other Security Implementations: Riot does not have that many extra security implementations, but since the
application is only in beta, they may be implemented in future versions. Fig. 21d shows the settings page providing
details about a chat room. The administrator of the room (the one who initialized the room) is the only user who
can change the settings of the room. The last setting shown in the figure is the option to enable encryption in that
specific room. Once encryption is enabled, it cannot be disabled throughout the conversation.
3.2.6 Case 6: Telegram
Telegram is an instant messaging platform which was started in 2013 after the NSA scandal. It has been developed
for smartphones, tablets and even computers.38 Telegram allows one-to-one and group communications, and the
possibility to send files to people in the contact list. The difference between Telegram and the other secure IM
applications is that it only offers opt-in secure messaging, while normal conversations are cloud chats that are
not end-to-end encrypted. Their motivation is to offer seamless cloud chat synchronization between all connected
38Telegram FAQ https://telegram.org/faq
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devices.39
For secure chatting, Telegram implements its own cryptographic protocol called the MTProto Protocol40. The
same protocol is also used for normal cloud chats to encrypt the communication between the server and the client.
(a) Phone number registration (b) Verification of phone number
Figure 22: Telegram: registration process
For end-to-end encrypted chats, it is not allowed to
screenshot inside the secret chat conversation. Hence, in
order to provide images for different test scenarios, we
used an external camera.
Initial Set Up: The initial setup of the Telegram ap-
plication and user registration is the same for the other
applications. Fig. 22a shows that the user needs to enter
her phone number for the registration process. As shown
in Fig. 22b, Telegram sends an activation code through
SMS, which can either be input manually or give Tele-
gram access to take it automatically. If the verification
message is not received in two minutes, a new SMS will
be sent. The user also can ask Telegram to call her and
activate it through phone call.
Message After a Key Change: The end-to-end en-
cryption is not enabled in Telegram by default. Normal
messages, which are called cloud chats on Telegram, are
not encrypted. Fig. 23a shows the first view Alice sees
when initiating a secret conversation with Bob, which says that the chat is end-to-end encrypted and the messages
cannot be forwarded for security reasons. Fig. 23b shows the first messages that have been sent from Alice to Bob,
and the double checkmarks illustrate that Bob has received and read the message (a single checkmark means that
the message has been sent). If Bob reinstalls his application and meanwhile Alice sends a message to Bob, then
Bob will never receive that message (even after finishing the re-installation of the application) as shown in Fig. 23c.
Thus, Telegram does not use the previous device keys after re-installing the application by one of the participants.
Hence, Alice needs to start a new secret chat with Bob and send the previous undelivered messages again. Telegram
does not store keys, or any other information that could reveal that two users have ever had a secret chat. Therefore,
Telegram cannot check whether one of the users has reinstalled the application or not.
Key Change While a Message is in Transit: As described in the last scenario, Telegram does not store any
information about Alice or Bob having a secret chat; all is done by the client and nothing is sent to the cloud of
Telegram. Therefore, there makes no sense to test this scenario, as it will have the same outcome as the one before.
Verification Process Between Participants: The verification process between Alice and Bob is rather difficult
when using secret chats in Telegram. If Alice wants to verify Bob’s encryption keys, she needs to open the specific
secure chats settings page and then click on the “Encryption Key” button. Telegram just supports messaging and
does not support calling for the verification. Figure 23d shows the verification page, with an image, which is derived
from the encryption key, and the encryption key below. There is no way for Alice to arrive to the conclusion that it
is the right image for the conversation.
39Seamless chat cloud synd, tweet by Pavel Durov in 2015 at https://twitter.com/durov/status/678305311921410048
40MTProto Protocol, by Nikolai Durov in Telegram Documentation, available at https://core.telegram.org/mtproto
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(a) Initial contact (b) Alice: Initial message (c) Message after reinstall
(d) Telegram: Verification pro-
cess
Figure 23: Telegram: message after a key change
(a) Privacy and Security settings (b) Passcode settings
Figure 24: Telegram: other security implementations
Other Security Implementations: Telegram supports
a few other security features. Inside the settings page,
there is one option to look at the “Privacy and Security”
settings for the application (Fig. 24a) Telegram supports
two-step verification, i.e., when a user wants to log in on
another device or after a reinstall, then they need to write
a second, personally chosen, password after the activa-
tion code received by SMS. “Active sessions” is a list of
devices the user has logged into. The last option, “Ac-
count self-destructs”, is a security measurement where if
the user has not used their account in the last six months,
the account gets deleted by Telegram. The length of
the counter for self-destructing can be changed to one
month, three months, six months or one year.
Fig. 24b shows options under the “Passcode Lock”.
This function locks the whole application with a pass-
code that the user chooses. Telegram has implemented
the possibility to unlock the application by fingerprint if
the user has added a fingerprint in the operating system.
A user has the chance to change when the application should auto-lock, from one minute to five hours. The last
option shown is the “Allow screen capture”, which (if enabled) allows users to screenshot anything inside the
application. However, for secure chats it is never allowed to screenshot.
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Table 2: Overview of the results from the analysis of secure messaging applications test scenarios.
Test Scenario and Properties
Application
Signal WhatsApp Wire Viber Riot Telegram
Setup and Registration
Phone Registration
E-mail Registration
Access SMS Inbox
Contact list Upload
Verification by SMS
Verification by Phone Call
Initial Contact
Trust-On-First-Use
Notification About E2E Encryption
Message After a Key Change
Notification about key changes
Blocking message
Key Change While a Message Is
In Transit
Re-encrypt and Send Message
Details About Transmission of Message
Verification Process
QR-Code
Verify By Phone Call
Share Keys Through 3rd Party
Verified Check
Other Security Implementations
Two-Step Verification
Passphrase/Code
Screen Security
Clear Trusted Contacts
Delete Devices From Account
: Has the property; : Does not have the property.
4 Summary of Results
The results of the tests are summarised in Table 2, listing what properties each application provides and which are
missing.
From this overview one can conclude that all applications provide mostly the same properties related to the
setup and registration phase. All applications except Riot support registration with the user’s phone numbers,
whereas Riot needs an e-mail address. Wire supports both phone number and e-mail address, which can also be
used later to log in. Access to the SMS inbox is not mandatory in any of the applications, but it is set up as default
to make it easier for the user, for otherwise one would need to enter the verification code manually. As Riot does
not use a phone number for verification, it does not need access to SMS. Wire also does not have access to the SMS
inbox because they believe that it is easy for the user to enter the verification code by hand.
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Uploading the contacts list to a server is required by all applications because it enables to find if any of the
contacts is already using the application. However, if a user, in order to remain anonymous, does not want to
upload her contacts list, she needs instead to only give out her phone number to particular persons in order to
communicate.
All the applications (except Riot that does not use a phone number) have the same properties when it comes to
verification by SMS and phone call. They all first give the user the option to verify by reading the SMS and if the
user never receives the SMS, then they can ask the application to call them.
Signal and WhatsApp have a Trust-On-First-Use method, where users trust the other participants in a conver-
sation without verifying first. The other applications ask users to verify each other first in order to be assured that
the conversation is secure.
A notification at the start of the conversation would be useful to a new user who does not know what end-to-end
encryption is, and having this only in the beginning would not bother the users. Only half of the applications have
this notification implemented.
The differences in the way applications are handling key changes are quite big. Only the Signal application
had both blocking messages and showed a notification that the other user in the conversation did not have the same
cryptographic keys after a reinstall. The blocking message functionality would not allow the sender to send a mes-
sage before they verify the new cryptographic keys of the receiver if the receiver has generated new cryptographic
keys during the conversation. Applications that do not give any notification or block sending of messages could be
target for man-in-the-middle attacks, since one of the participants would never get the notification of key changes
and thus could not detect any inconsistencies in the hijacked conversation. Wire and Viber are particularly vulner-
able to this. The secret chats of Telegram do not work if cryptographic keys change because the application does
not store any information about secret chats. The participants would need to re-start the conversation.
The only application that re-encrypts the messages and sends them again after the receiver gets new crypto-
graphic keys was WhatsApp. This is a useful usability property, which we hope it would be implemented by the
rest of the applications as well. There is one problem with the way WhatsApp re-encrypts and sends the message
again: it never asks the user if it is the correct receiver because the keys have changed.
The “details about the transmission of a message” property questions whether the applications show to the
sender that the message is either sent, delivered, or seen by the receiver. If the message is never delivered because
of changes to the receivers cryptographic keys, then the message is only tagged as “sent” for the sender, but if the
message is re-encrypted and sent correctly, then the message details should also indicate “seen” by the receiver.
The only application that does not show any information about whether past messages are sent or delivered is Viber.
Signal and WhatsApp have the easiest verification process, using a QR-code in conjunction with a built-in
scanner. However, both have shortcomings since they do not have a check for revealing whether the particular user
is already verified. Wire, Viber, and Riot confirmed when a user is already verified, but they did not have the useful
QR-code nor any way of sharing the keys outside the application. Telegram was the only application which only
offered a QR-code but no way of actually scanning the code. Users had to read the secret keys that are shared
between them, whereas the image encoding has no technical way of comparing it, besides by only looking at it.
WhatsApp and Telegram have two-step verification capabilities, which means that whenever a user reinstalls the
application or changes devices, they need to enter a second password after the normal verification code from the
provider, in order to gain access to their account on the new device.
Signal and Telegram both had a passphrase or code that the user had to enter in order to gain access to the
application after some specific timeout expires. Both applications have also implemented screen security to not
give potential intruders the ability to screenshot conversations. There is a setting to toggle the security off, but it is
on by default in both Signal and Telegram.
The only application which had a list of verified contacts, and the option to delete them, was Viber. Clients
such as Wire and Riot, which have a verified check on each contact within a conversation, do not offer this option
even if it is not difficult to implement since they already know which contacts and their devices are verified.
The “delete devices from account” is only interesting for those applications that support multiple devices. All
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the applications which supported multiple devices also had a list of devices such that the user could delete a device
which is not in use anymore.
5 Discussions and Recommendations
Instead of focusing on one test scenario at a time, like in the previous section, this section discusses and evaluates
each application as a whole. Moreover, based on the knowledge gained from the test scenarios, some possible im-
provements for each application are provided, which have to be verified critically using modelling and verification
techniques (besides standard software testing) in order to ensure that an improvement does not break other security
properties.
5.1 Signal
The experiments conducted in Sec. 3.2.1 demonstrate that the Signal app does not have major weaknesses. How-
ever, there are several potential improvements that we discuss in the following. Signal showed good understanding
and care for the user experience, with an easy verification process. The users can employ QR-Codes for the ver-
ification purpose and/or can call each other and do the verification process through end-to-end encrypted phone
calls.
When a party sends a message after changing the keys, the application blocks the message until the sender and
receiver verify each other again. This is a useful property, but the application does not reveal the notification im-
mediately when one of the participants in the conversation changes her keys (for example, due to the re-installation
of the application).
Overall, the application has both good security when it comes to end-to-end encryption and useful user expe-
rience properties which would not cause problems for new users. The following provides recommendations for
improvement that are applicable to the Signal app. We first state the feature in general terms, and then explicit it
for the specific app if needed.
(A) Re-encrypt and send lost messages: Give the user an option to re-encrypt a lost message and resend it after
finishing the re-verification process, so that messages would not get lost during a conversation. In the Signal
application, the sender of a message can know the status of her messages (i.e., sent or delivered/read) due to
the existence of checkmarks on each message, making the implementation of this feature easy.
(B) Notification about key changes: It is recommended for an application to show a notification message
immediately after each change of cryptographic keys. If the keys of a party in a conversation change, then
the Signal application does not show any notification message to the participants immediately. It only gives
the notification (that the keys are changed) when one party wants to send a message to another one (after
changing the keys).
(C) Notification on end-to-end encryption: Giving a notification at the beginning of each conversation stating
that it is now end-to-end encrypted and the possibility to read more about it, could help educate the end-users
about what E2E encryption is and why they should care about it.
(D) Verified check: Offer visual cues so the user can easily know that a party should be verified again to regain
the trust properties. As demonstrated by our experiments, in the Signal application, there is no way to know
if a user is already verified or not. However, if the application already keeps the list of verified contacts, then
when one of the participants changes her cryptographic keys, it should be easy to implement this feature.
(E) Two-step verification: The security of an application would be improved by adding a “two-step verification”
option, which, e.g., when a user wants to change her device or reinstall the application, she has to enter a
previously chosen password, besides the code received in the SMS.
34The Snowden Phone: A Comparative Survey of Secure Instant Messaging Mobile Applications(authors’ version)
5.2 WhatsApp
The results of the experiments do not show major weaknesses in the WhatsApp application. However, the What-
sApp application can be improved in several ways as discussed below. WhatsApp takes great care to strengthen the
security around the user’s account and messages; however, it may suffer from impersonation attacks. Recommen-
dations applicable to WhatsApp.
(F) Block messaging until verification: In order to prevent sending private messages to an impersonator, the
participants should not be able to send any message before verifying each other. The WhatsApp application
immediately re-encrypts a lost message when it finds out that the cryptographic keys have changed and
the receiver never received the message. Hence, an adversary may impersonate a legitimate contact and
consequently WhatsApp re-encrypts and sends lost messages to the adversary who would thus receive private
messages in an unauthorized way. Since this process is automatically controlled by the app, even the sender
cannot stop re-encrypting and resending of lost messages after a key change. In order to overcome this
weakness, the application must suspend the process of re-encrypting and resending of lost messages (after a
key change) until the new cryptographic keys are verified.
(G) Locking the application using a passphrase/code: Adding an option that requires a passphrase or code
before opening the application, would enhance the security of the user’s account from unauthorized access. If
an adversary somehow gets access to a user’s phone, she would be unable to access the application messages
as she does not know the passphrase/code.
5.3 Wire
The Wire application features several useful security and usability properties. However, there are some properties
which are not provided and might cause serious security problems. In this application, if a user uses a new device,
Wire does not notify the other participants in a conversation. Thus, an impersonator may join the conversation and
receive all the exchanged messages. Recommendations applicable to Wire are (A),41 (E), (F), (G) from above, as
well as the new ones below.
(H) Notify users regarding verification: When the application does not verify participants, it should notify users
that they have to verify each other manually when initiating a new conversation, to prevent impersonation
attacks.
(I) Notification about the verification of new devices: Notify the other participants that a user added a new
device and they have to verify the new device before sending any more messages (as the new device will also
receive these messages). The Wire application allows a user to use the same account on multiple devices.
However, if a user (in a conversation) adds a new device, the other participants (in that conversation) will not
be notified about this change.
(J) More verification options: Provide several different ways of performing the verification. For example,
a QR-code or sharing keys with a third-party application are some possible options. Managing keys and
authentication credential could greatly benefit from a secure device attached to the smart phone like the
OffPAD [37], in conjunction with a proxy that knows how to use such a device as in the OTDP architecture
of [38]. Wire provides only calling a person every time, which may become cumbersome for users.
(K) Screen Security: The privacy can be improved by providing a “screen security” option, which does not allow
screenshots to be taken within the conversations. It is worth to mention that the screen security is useful if
all participants in a conversation enable it. Because, if a user does not enable this option, then she can take a
snapshot and thus breaches the privacy of the other participants in the conversation.
41Note that the Wire application uses a text under each message to show the status of the message (e.g., delivered or sent), which makes
easy to implement this feature.
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5.4 Viber
The Viber application provides some good usability and security properties. However, there are several question-
able aspects which make us reluctant in recommending this application. If the cryptographic keys of a user in a
conversation change (e.g., because of re-installation), Viber does not notify the other participants in the conversa-
tion about such changes. In addition, if a user sends several messages while the receiver is re-installing Viber, then
the sender cannot know whether the previous messages have been received or not. Many of the observations for
Viber are easy to fix or implement, in our opinion, and would drastically improve the application. These include
(A), (B), (E), (F), (G), (H), (J), (K) from above, as well as the new one below.
(L) Labeling the status of messages: It is important for all messages in a conversation to have a label stating
their status (e.g., sent, delivered, read, etc.). In Viber, only the last message in a conversation is labeled with
status information.
5.5 Riot
The Riot application is still in beta stage, and despite its usability and security properties, it can still be improved.
When cryptographic keys change during a conversation, the previous messages are locked for the user (who is
reinstalling the application). However, there is an option for the sender to send the locked messages (encrypted
with new keys) again. In Riot the users do not receive any notification message regarding the key changes (and the
need to re-verify each other). Moreover, Riot does not use end-to-end encryption by default. In addition, Riot does
not provide an easy way for the verification of the users. Recommendations applicable to Riot are (E), (G), (J), (K)
from above.
5.6 Telegram
The telegram application has some useful security properties, but the usability features are rather lacking and
confusing for people who are not tech savvy. The biggest flaw in a secure messaging application is that the end-
to-end encryption is not on by default. Hence, an explicit secret chat needs to be initiated every time users want
to communicate. We think that this should become a norm these days for an application that advertises encrypted
conversations.
In Telegram, if a user sends a message while the cryptographic keys have changed, the intended receiver does
not get that message because secret chats are locked to one set of keys. Hence, if a user generates new keys, the
participants need to start a new secret chat and cannot continue the previous secret chat. This is good for security,
but the problem arises since Telegram does not notify users about key changes.
Telegram provides just one way for the verification of users, showing QR-codes in person, which is not good
enough for a secure messaging application. We believe that Telegram can be improved by providing more options,
such as calling or sharing keys through third-party applications. Recommendations applicable to Telegram are (B),
(D), (J), (K) from above.
6 Conclusion and Further work
The work reported here conducted two analyses about secure messaging protocols and the applications which
implement these types of protocols. The first analysis (following the recent article by Unger et al. [45]) described
old and new secure messaging protocols that offer end-to-end encryption and identified types of security and privacy
properties they provide, in Section 2. This review of protocols is an important prerequisite for understanding our
analysis of the applications implementing them, which is our main contribution presented in Section 3. The Signal
and Matrix protocols are both secure messaging protocols that manage end-to-end encryption well, but none of
them could offer every security property. The analysis concluded that none of the secure messaging protocols
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could provide every security property. The Signal protocol does not fully support multiple devices, while the
Matrix protocol does this well. On the other hand, the Matrix protocol does not fully provide forward and future
secrecy in the protocol, and leave it up to the implementation to support it. The Signal protocol is designed to use a
server for achieving the asynchronous messaging property. Even if messages are encrypted end-to-end there is still
important metadata that is being manipulated and stored on the server. Therefore one would wish to secure better
the server side, especially when deployed in a cloud infrastructure or in a country with legislation that disregards
privacy. Initial results in this direction have been presented in [43] using the recent technology of Intel SGX. This
is applicable to Matrix too.
The second conducted analysis was the research experiment of applications which support these secure mes-
saging protocols for their conversations, i.e., in Section 3. The applications offer useful usability together with
security, and we would strongly recommend general public to adopt one of them (i.e., the one most suited for their
needs, after reading through our analysis). We believe that even for common (non-technology people) would be
very easy to adopt one of these applications; i.e., it would have the same difficulties (if one could call the such)
as any other chat application, whereas the ones related to encryption would not add many difficulties. However,
there are multiple applications which still could benefit from improvements. We have provided recommendations,
in Section 5, for each application to harden their security around the user’s account, but at the same time keep the
useful usability properties. The given recommendations are not tested to confirm that it is the best choice for the
applications, and it is up to the developers to prioritise if they think it would benefit their application and users.
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